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We present a quantum communication protocol which keeps all the properties of the ping-pong
protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] but improves the capacity doubly as the ping-pong
protocol. Alice and Bob can use the variable measurement basises in control mode to detect Eve’s
eavesdropping attack. In message mode, Alice can use one unitary operations to encode two bits
information. Bob only needs to perform a Bell type measurement to decode Alice’s information. A
classical message authentification method can protect this protocol against the eavesdropping hiding
in the quantum channel losses and the denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
Since Bennett and Brassard presented the pioneer quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol in 1984 [1], there are a
lot of theoretical QKD schemes [1-12] today. Recently, Beige et al. proposed a quantum secure direct communication
scheme [13], which allows messages communicated directly without first establishing a random key to encrypt them.
Bostroem and Felbingeer presented a ping-pong protocol [14] which is secure for key distribution and quasisecure for
direct communication with a perfect quantum channel. However, an eavesdropper-Eve can eavesdrop the information
if the quantum channel is noisy [15]. And this ping-pong protocol can attacked without eavesdropping [16]. Moreover,
the capacity is restricted, and an entangled state only carries one bit of classical information in every message run.
In this paper, we give an improved ping-pong protocol, which allows one entangled state carrying two classical bits
in every message run. And we show this protocol is secure with a classical message authentification method.
Let us start with the brief description of the ping-pong protocol. Suppose Bob have two photons that are maximally
entangled in their polarization degree of freedom, |ψ± >= 1√
2
(|1 > |0 > ±|0 > |1 >). Since the reduced density
matrices, ρA = trB{|ψ± >< ψ±|} are completely mixture, then one can not distinguish the state |ψ± > from each
other by only access one qubit. Since the state |ψ± > are mutually orthogonal , a measurement on both qubit can
perfectly distinguish the states form each other. Bob sends one of the photon (travel photon) to Alice and keeps
another (home qubit). Alice can performs a unitary operation Uj,
Uj = (|0 >< 0| − |1 >< 1|)j , (1)
where j ∈ {0, 1}, on the travel qubit to encode her information j. Then she sends this qubit back to Bob. When
Bob receives the travel qubit, she performs a joint measurement on both photons to decode Alice’s information. To
confirm the security of this communication, Alice randomly switches the message mode to control mode. In control
mode Alice measures the travel qubit in basis Bz = {|0 >, |1 >}and announces the result in the public channel. When
receiving Alice’s result, Bob also switches to control mode. Bob measures the home qubit in basis Bz and compares
the both results. If both results coincide, there is Eve in line. Else, this communication continues.
In every message run, Alice encodes one bit on the travel qubit. As it is well known, there are four Bell states that
are mutual orthogonal to each other, |ψ± >, |φ± >. And local unitary operation can transform these four states to
each other. The Bell’s states can be written as
|φ+ > = 1√
2
(|0 > |0 > +|1 > |1 >)
=
1√
2
(|+ > |+ > +|− > |− >), (2)
|φ− > = 1√
2
(|0 > |0 > −|1 > |1 >)
=
1√
2
(|+ > |− > +|− > |+ >), (3)
|ψ+ > = 1√
2
(|0 > |1 > +|1 > |0 >)
=
1√
2
(|+ > |+ > −|− > |− >), (4)
1
|ψ+ > = 1√
2
(|0 > |1 > −|1 > |0 >)
=
1√
2
(|+ > |− > −|− > |+ >), (5)
where |+ >= 1√
2
(|0 > +|1 >), |− >= 1√
2
(|0 > −|1 >). Suppose Bob prepare an EPR pair in state |ψ− >. In message
mode, Alice performs a unitary Uij to encode her information, where Uij are
U00 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, U01 =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
,
U10 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, U11 =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
, (6)
corresponding to Alice’s 00,01,10,11. When Bob receives the travel back qubit, he can performs a Bell type mea-
surement in basis {|ψ± >, |φ± >} to decode Alice’s information. Then one EPR pair can transmit two bits in every
message run.
To ensure the security of this protocol, the control mode should be modified. In control mode. Alice receives the
travel qubit. Alice performs a measurement randomly in the basis Bz = {|0 >, |1 >} or Bx = {|+ >, |− >}. Then
she announces her measurement result and the basis through public channel. Bob also switches to control mode. He
performs a measurement in the same basis Alice used. If both results coincide, then there is Eve in line. Else, Bob
sends next qubit to Alice.
Since ρA = trB{|ψ± >< ψ±|} = trB{|φ± ><± φ|} = 12 |0 >< 0| + 12 |1 >< 1|, Eve can not distinguish each Bell
state if she only attack the travel after Alice encoding operation. So she has to attack the travel in line B → A first.
After Alice’s encoding operation, she performs a measurement attack in line A→ B to draw Alice’s information. Let
us assume that the state |ψ− > becomes ρ after Eve’s attack in line B → A. Then the information Eve can gain from
ρ is bounded by the Holevo quantity, χ(ρ) [17]. Because Holevo quantity decreases under quantum operations [17,18],
then the mutual information Eve can gain after Alice’s encoding operation is determined by χ(ρ). From
χ(ρ) = S(ρ)−
∑
i
piS(ρi), (7)
we know S(ρ) is the upper bound of χ(ρ). ‘High fidelity implies low entropy’. Suppose
F (|ψ− >, ρ)2 =< ψ−|ρ|ψ− >= 1− γ, (8)
where F (|ψ− >, ρ) is the fidelity [19] of state |ψ− > and ρ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Therefore, the entropy of ρ is bounded above
by the entropy of a diagonal density matrix ρmax with diagonal entries 1− γ, γ3 , γ3 , γ3 . Then entropy of ρmax is
S(ρmax) = −(1− γ) log(1− γ)− γ log γ
3
. (9)
Let us discuss the relation between the fidelity F (|ψ− >, ρ) and the detection probability d. In control mode,
when the states Alice and Bob shared are |φ± >, their measurement results will coincide every time when they
use the measurement Bz. When the state they shared is |ψ+ >, their measurement results will coincide when they
use the measurement basis Bx. Only their state is |ψ− >, they measurement results will never coincide. Since
F (|ψ− >, ρ)2 = 1−γ, then the detection probability is d ≥ γ/2. From Eq.(9), we know when γ = 0, i.e., Eve does not
attack the state |ψ− > in line B → A, the detection probability d = 0. When γ > 0, i.e., Eve can gain some of Alice’s
information, she has to face a nonzero risk d ≥ γ/2 to be detected. When γ = 3
4
, it has S(ρmax) = 2, which implies
Eve has chance to eavesdrop full of Alice’s information. On this condition, it has the maximal detection probability
d ≥ 3
8
.
W
′
ojcik presented an eavesdropping scheme [15] which reveals that the ping-pong is not secure for transmission
efficiencies lower than 60%. A classical message authentification method can protect this ping-pong protocol against
the eavesdropping hiding in the quantum channel losses. Actually, in this improved ping-pong protocol, the eaves-
dropping hiding in quantum channel losses can be detected because of the variable measurement basises in control
mode.
In Ref.[16], it has been shown that the ping-pong protocol can be attacked without eavesdropping. Eve can attack
the travel qubit in line A→ B. She can perform a unitary operation on the travel qubit to change the states. Also,
she can performs a measurement on the travel qubit to destroy the EPR states. But any message authentification
method can protect this protocol against the man-in-the-middle attacks with a reliable public channel.
2
In summary, we present a protocol which keeps all properties of the ping-pong protocol but improves the capacity
doubly as the ping-pong protocol. And this protocol can protect the eavesdropping hiding in quantum channel losses.
And the message authentification method can protect the protocol against the man-in-the-middle attacks.
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